Quantum Key Distribution Using Quantum Faraday Rotators by Choi, Taeseung & Choi, Mahn-Soo
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
12
20
8v
2 
 2
6 
A
ug
 2
00
7
Quantum key distribution using quantum Faraday rotators
Taeseung Choi and Mahn-Soo Choi∗
Department of Physics, Korea University, Seoul 136-713, Korea
(Dated: August 20, 2018)
Abstract
We propose a new quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on the fully quantum me-
chanical states of the Faraday rotators. The protocol is unconditionally secure against collective
attacks for multi-photon source up to two photons on a noisy environment. It is also robust
against impersonation attacks. The protocol may be implemented experimentally with the current
spintronics technology on semiconductors.
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∗Electronic address: choims@korea.ac.kr
1
I. INTRODUCTION
The computational algorithm powered by quantum mechanics, on the one hand, has
posed a serious threat to the classical cryptosystem[1]. On the other hand, quantum cryp-
tography allows for secure sharing of private keys. Ever since the pioneering works by Ben-
net, Brassard, and Ekert[2, 3, 4], a great number of new quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols have been proposed to enhance the security and efficiency under non-idealistic
situations and to incorporate new ideas[5]. In particular, Bostro¨m and Felbinger[6] recently
proposed the so-called ping-pong protocol. The protocol is interesting in that it enables direct
communication deterministically and without classical communications (except for checking
eavesdropping). Although the original protocol turned out to be insecure in the case of lossy
channels[7] and against blind attacks without eavesdropping[8], the idea still survives in a
recent modified version[9].
In the ping-pong protocol[6, 9], Bob sends a qubit to Alice, Alice performs a unitary
operation on it with a random probability p and send it back to Bob, and finally Bob make a
measurement on it. The unitary operation by Alice (if ever performed) transforms the initial
state of the qubit to a state orthogonal to the initial state. This enables Bob to read Alice’s
massage directly. Putting another way, the unitary operation is performed conditioned on
the classical information (0 or 1) that Alice wants to send to Bob. A conceptually interesting
question would be, “What if we perform the unitary operation conditioned on the quantum
state of another qubit?” In this work, we propose a new QKD protocol implementing this
idea and address the security issues of it. The protocol is explained in Section II. We
will show in Sections III and IV that the protocol is secure against eavesdropping for ideal
single-photon source and robust against impersonation attacks. The protocol turns out to
be insecure when the photon source produces more than two photons; this will be analyzed
in Section V. We will discuss in Section VI possible experimental realizations of the protocol
using semiconductor spintronics.
II. PROTOCOL
While the protocol is independent of the physical system in use, we will have in mind the
photon polarizations as travel qubits and electron spins as home qubits. In the description
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FIG. 1: (color on-line) (a) Poincare´ sphere for photon polarization or Bloch sphere for spin. (b)
Quantum Faraday rotation (QFR) or conditional rotation UA;C on C conditioned by A; see Eq. (2).
It rotates the state of qubit C around z-axis by angle ±pi/2 depending on the state of qubit A.
FIG. 2: (color on-line) Quantum key distribution protocol using quantum Faraday rotators.
of the protocol, we will use as the basis the eigenstates of σz, |↑〉 (right-handed circular
polarization) and |↓〉 (left-handed circular polarization). We denote by |φ〉 the state along
the azimuthal angle φ on the equator of the Poincare´ (or Bloch) sphere:
|φ〉 = |↑〉+ e
+iφ |↓〉√
2
. (1)
The key element of our protocol will be the quantum Faraday rotation (QFR), namely, the
Faraday rotation by angle π/2 around z-axis of the Poincare´ sphere
UA;C = exp [−i(π/4)σzAσzC ] (2)
on the travel qubit C conditioned by the home qubit A. For example, operating on the
product state |φ = 0〉A |φ〉C , it gives
UA;C |0〉A |φ〉C =
e−ipi/4 |↑〉A |φ+〉C + e+ipi/4 |↓〉A |φ−〉C√
2
, (3)
where |φ±〉 = |φ± π/2〉. In the quantum information theoretic terms, the QFR in Eq. (2)
corresponds to the conditional phase shift. Possible physical realizations of QFR will be
discussed later.
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The protocol is as following. (1) To start the nth iteration of the protocol, Alice and
Bob first prepare their home qubits A and B, respectively, in the state |φ = 0〉[10]. (2) Alice
then takes a travel qubit C and prepares it in the state |α〉. The angle α should be chosen
randomly in the interval 0 ≤ α < 2π. (3) Alice performs (by interacting A and C) the
QFR UA;C on C and send it to Bob. We note that on its way to Bob, the travel qubit C is
maximally entangled with A:
e−ipi/4 |↑〉A |α+〉C + e+ipi/4 |↓〉A |α−〉C (4)
(not normalized). (4) Bob receives C, performs UB;C on it, and send it back to Alice. The
qubit C is again maximally entangled on its way back to Alice, now with both A and B :
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉)AB |α〉C − i (|↑↑〉 − |↓↓〉)AB |α¯〉C (5)
(not normalized), where |α¯〉 ≡ |α + π〉. (5) Now Bob takes his own travel qubit D and
prepares it in the state |β〉. The angle β should be chosen randomly in the interval 0 ≤
β < 2π. (6) Bob performs the QFR UB;D on D and send it to Alice. (7) Alice receives D,
performs UA;D on it, and send it back to Bob. The final state of all the qubits A, B, C, and
D is given by a GHZ-like state
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉)AB |αβ〉CD − (|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉)AB
∣∣α¯β¯〉
CD
(6)
(8) Alice measures the observable Sα = cosασ
x + sinασy on C. Likewise, Bob measures
the observable Sβ = cos βσ
x + sin βσy on D. They will get (in the ideal case) the identical
result +1 or −1, which enables Alice and Bob to share the the key K2n−1 = 1 or 0. (9) If
K2n−1 = 1, Bob performs σ
x (the NOT gate), on his home qubit B. (10) Alice and Bob
measures σz on their home qubits A and B, respectively. Depending on the measurement
result, another bit of key K2n = 0 (σ
x = +1) or 1 (σx = −1) is generated. (11) Repeat
the steps 1 through 10 with n increased by 1 until n becomes N . (12) Alice and Bob takes
randomly M bits out of {K2k−1|k = 1, · · · , N}, and test possible eavesdropping (or any
other attack) by comparing the values through a classical communication channel.
A few remarks on the procedure are in order. Alice can measure Sα (see Step 8 above)
even before the Step 5. It follows from the GHZ-like structure of the states in Eqs. (5) and
(6). Step 9 is not essential. It can be removed with a minor change in Step 10.
Before analyzing the security of the protocol, we point out a few interesting features of
the protocol. First, the travel qubit is always in a maximally entangled states with the home
4
FIG. 3: (color on-line) General attack on a noisy environment.
qubit(s) whenever exposed to eavesdropping. This is the essential feature of the protocol
that provides the protocol with the security. Second, at the key sharing stage no classical
communication is necessary. The key is shared only through the quantum channel[11]. This
is also closely related to the security of the protocol. Third, two bits are generated out of
one iteration and they have the common security fate. If the first bit has been tampered
by eavesdropping or noise in the channel, the security of the second bit is not guaranteed
either.
III. SECURITY PROOF
Let us analyze general attacks from a third party in case the photon source generates
single photon. We closely follow the lines in Ref.[9]. As usual, Eve is assumed to be an
almighty eavesdropper limited only by the law of physics. The most general (assuming that
Eve does not know Alice’s choice of basis) operation Eˆ1 Eve can do on the travel qubit C
can be written as
Eˆ1 |γ〉C |ǫ〉E = e |γ〉C |ǫ00〉E + f |γ¯〉C |ǫ01〉E , (7)
and
Eˆ1 |γ¯〉C |ǫ〉E = e |γ¯〉C |ǫ11〉E + f |γ〉C |ǫ10〉E , (8)
where the states |ǫ00〉, |ǫ01〉, |ǫ11〉, and |ǫ10〉 of the ancilla E are normalized, but not orthogonal
to each other. Without loss of generality, we can set 〈ǫ00|ǫ01〉 = 〈ǫ00|ǫ10〉 = 〈ǫ10|ǫ11〉 =
〈ǫ01|ǫ11〉 = 0, from the unitarity of E1[9].
The basis {|γ〉 , |γ¯〉} for C is an arbitrary choice made by Eve. Recall that the angle α has
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been chosen randomly for each travel qubit C and is never announced to the public; this is
one of the biggest differences of our protocol both from the BB84-type and ping-pong-type
protocols.
When 〈ǫ00|ǫ11〉 = 〈ǫ01|ǫ10〉 = 1, Eve cannot distinguish between |γ〉C and |γ¯〉C by any
measurement on her ancillae. In this case, Eve can acquire no more information than no
attack is performed. Therefore, a minimal requirement for Eve’s strategy is that such an
operation as gives no information at all to her should not be detected by the legitimate
partners (Alice and Bob). This can be achieved if Eve does not disturb travel qubits. It
gives the condition, |e| = 1 and |f | = 0. In passing, we note that 〈ǫ00|ǫ11〉 = 0 corresponds
to an intercept-and-resend attack.
Having this (|e| = 1 and |f | = 0) in mind, we rewrite the attack operation on the travel
qubit as
Eˆ1 |α+〉C = |α+〉C
(
cos2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉+ sin2 α˜
2
|ǫ11〉
)
+ i sin
α˜
2
cos
α˜
2
|α−〉C (|ǫ00〉 − |ǫ11〉) (9)
and
Eˆ1 |α−〉C = −i sin
α˜
2
cos
α˜
2
|α+〉C (|ǫ00〉 − |ǫ11〉)
+ |α−〉C
(
sin2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉+ cos2 α˜
2
|ǫ11〉
)
, (10)
where α˜ ≡ α− γ + π/2.
On C’s way from Bob back to Alice, Eve can perform another similar attack Eˆ2 with a
new ancilla F . With the same requirement as in Eˆ1, the attack operation Eˆ2 takes the simple
form
Eˆ2 |γ〉C |η〉F = |γ〉C |η00〉F (11)
and
Eˆ2 |γ¯〉C |η〉F = |γ¯〉C |η11〉F . (12)
Since our protocol is symmetric between Alice and Bob, Eve’s attack operations Eˆ ′1 and Eˆ ′2
on Bob’s travel qubitD can be written, analogously to Eˆ1 and Eˆ2, with respect to new ancillae
E ′ and F ′. The optimal Eve’s attack will be the symmetric one such that 〈ǫ00|ǫ11〉 = 〈ǫ′00|ǫ′11〉
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and 〈η00|η11〉 = 〈η′00|η′11〉. The angle β˜ = β − γ + π/2 relates Bob’s choice {|β〉 ,
∣∣β¯〉} and
Eve’s choice {|γ〉 , |γ¯〉} for the basis for D.
After all the procedures by Alice and Bob, Eve performs a collective measurement on her
ancillae E, F , E ′, and F ′. From the measurement result, she extracts the information about
the state of Alice’s home qubit A and Bob’s B; namely, the information about the results
of the QFR on the travel qubits C and D. The information is eventually the information
about the key values shared by Alice and Bob.
The operations Eˆ1, Eˆ2, Eˆ ′1, and Eˆ ′2 by Eve inevitably disturb the quantum state of the travel
qubit C and D. Simply comparing the test key bits (step 12 of the protocol), Alice and Bob
may detect the attack. The detection probability pd depends on the angle differences α˜ and
β˜. Since the angles α˜ and β˜ are randomly distributed, the detection probability is given by
pd =
3
8
− 1
8
(
cos2 x+ cos2 y + cos2 x cos2 y
)
, (13)
where cosx ≡ 〈ǫ00|ǫ11〉 = 〈ǫ′00|ǫ′11〉 and cos y ≡ 〈η00|η11〉 = 〈η′00|η′11〉. The maximum value of
pd is 3/8 corresponding to the intercept-and-resend attack(cos x = cos y = 0).
Let us suppose that the initial state prepared by Alice and Bob is given by
|Ψ〉i = |0〉A |0〉B |αβ〉CD . (14)
After all attacks the final state is given by
7
12
|αβ〉CD
{
1
4
sin α˜ sin β˜ |↑↑〉AB |1〉EF |1′〉E′F ′ + |↑↓〉AB |5〉EF |2′〉E′F ′
+ |↓↑〉AB |2〉EF |5′〉E′F ′ +
1
4
sin α˜ sin β˜ |↓↓〉AB |4〉EF |4′〉E′F ′
}
+
1
2
∣∣αβ¯〉
CD
{
− i
2
sin α˜ |↑↑〉AB |1〉EF |3′〉E′F ′ −
i
2
sin β˜ |↑↓〉AB |5〉EF |1′〉E′F ′
+
i
2
sin β˜ |↓↑〉AB |2〉EF |4′〉E′F ′ +
i
2
sin α˜ |↓↓〉AB |4〉EF |6′〉E′F ′
}
1
2
|α¯β〉CD
{
− i
2
sin β˜ |↑↑〉AB |3〉EF |1′〉E′F ′ +
i
2
sin α˜ |↑↓〉AB |4〉EF |2′〉E′F ′
− i
2
sin α˜ |↓↑〉AB |1〉EF |5′〉E′F ′ +
i
2
sin β˜ |↓↓〉AB |6〉EF |4′〉E′F ′
}
+
1
2
∣∣α¯β¯〉
CD
{
− |↑↑〉AB |3〉EF |3′〉E′F ′ +
1
4
sin α˜ sin β˜ |↑↓〉AB |4〉EF |1′〉E′F ′
+
1
4
sin α˜ sin β˜ |↓↑〉AB |1〉EF |4′〉E′F ′ − |↓↓〉AB |6〉EF |6′〉E′F ′
}
(15)
with
|1〉EF ≡ |ǫ00〉E |η00〉F − |ǫ11〉E |η11〉F (16)
|2〉EF ≡ sin2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉E |η00〉F + cos2
α˜
2
|ǫ11〉E |η11〉F (17)
|3〉EF ≡ cos2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉E |η00〉F + sin2
α˜
2
|ǫ11〉E |η11〉F (18)
|4〉EF ≡ |ǫ00〉E |η11〉F − |ǫ11〉E |η00〉F (19)
|5〉EF ≡ cos2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉E |η11〉F + sin2
α˜
2
|ǫ11〉E |η00〉F (20)
and
|6〉EF ≡ sin2
α˜
2
|ǫ00〉E |η11〉F + cos2
α˜
2
|ǫ11〉E |η00〉F (21)
The states |1′〉E′F ′, |2′〉E′F ′, |3′〉E′F ′, |4′〉E′F ′, |5′〉E′F ′, and |6′〉E′F ′ are defined analogously
(with α˜ replaced by β˜).
Equation (15) clearly reveals how Eve can extract the information about the quantum
state of the Alice’s and Bob’s home qubits A and B, respectively. For example, Eve can infer
the state |↑〉B on Bob’s home qubit B if she finds her ancilla qubits E and F in the collective
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state |1〉EF , |2〉EF , or |3〉EF . Likewise, Eve infers the state |↓〉B if she finds E and F in the
state |4〉EF , |5〉EF , or |6〉EF . The state of Alice’s home qubit A can be inferred analogously
from the ancillae E ′ and F ′. The remaining question for Eve would be, for example, how to
distinguish the states |1〉EF , |2〉EF , and |3〉EF from |4〉EF , |5〉EF , and |6〉EF .
To this end, we first note that
〈1|4〉EF = 〈1|5〉EF = 〈1|6〉EF = 0 (22)
and that
〈4|1〉EF = 〈4|2〉EF = 〈4|3〉EF = 0 . (23)
Therefore, Eve’s best policy will be first to exploit the orthogonal subspaces containing |1〉EF
and |4〉EF , respectively, and then to distinguish the non-orthogonal states, namely |2〉EF and
|3〉EF from |5〉EF and |6〉EF , within these subspaces. Further, defining the normalized overlap
〈i|j〉EF ≡
〈i|j〉EF√〈i|i〉EF 〈j|j〉EF (24)
(i, j = 1, · · · , 6), we have the inequalities
〈2|5〉EF = 〈3|6〉EF ≥ min{cosx, cos y} (25)
and
〈2|6〉EF = 〈3|5〉EF ≥ min{cosx, cos y} (26)
Namely, the states |2〉EF and |3〉EF can be distinguished worse from |5〉EF and |6〉EF than
any two states with the mutual overlap of min{cosx, cos y} can be distinguished from each
other. Based on this observation, we analyze the worst case, where 〈2|5〉EF = 〈3|6〉EF =
〈2|6〉EF = 〈3|5〉EF = min{cosx, cos y}. Further, it is clear that the optimal attack for Eve is
the balanced one [9], for which cosx = cos y, and hereafter we focus on the balanced case.
Putting all the above observations together and with lengthy algebra, one can calculate
the mutual information I(A,B) between Alice and Bob and I(A,E) [or I(B,E)] between
Alice (or Bob) and Eve; note that because of the symmetry in our protocol, I(A,E) =
I(B,E). They are given by
I(A,B) = 1 + pd log2 pd + (1− pd) log2(1− pd) (27)
and
I(A,E) = 1 + pe log2 pe + (1− pe) log2(1− pe) , (28)
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FIG. 4: (a) Mutual information a function of the detection probability, pd, for general incoherent
attacks against our protocol. The solid (dashed) line represents the mutual information I(A,B)
[I(A,E)] between Alice and Bob (Alice and Eve). (b) I(A,B) + I(A,E) as a function of pd for
our protocol (solid line) and for the BB84 protocol (dashed line). For our protocol, the maximum
value of pd is 3/8.
respectively. pd in Eq. (27) is the detection probability [see Eq. (13)] for the balanced attack
(cosx = cos y), and pe in Eq. (28) is defined by
pe =
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 2pd(1−
√
1− 2pd)
[
2
√
1− 2pd +
√
2(1−
√
1− 2pd)
]
. (29)
For a QKD to be secure, it is required that I(A,B) ≥ I(A,E)[5]. The mutual information
I(A,B) and I(A,E) are plotted as functions of the detection probability pd in Fig. 4. The
maximum information between Alice and Eve occurs at pd = 0.345, which is less than the
maximum detection probability (pd = 3/8) corresponding to the intercept-and-resend attack.
This means that the intercept-and-resend attack is not an optimal attack for Eve. I(A,B)
and I(A,E) becomes equal for the detection probability pd = 0.266188. This detection
probability is greater than pd = 0.18 for the ping-pong protocol [9] and pd = 0.15 for BB84
protocol.
So far the security has been analyzed for incoherent attacks. In general, Eve can attacks
many qubits coherently by collecting many ancillae and performing a global measurement on
them. Since our protocol shares many common features with the BB84 or similar protocols,
we can first follow the lines in Section VI.G of Ref. [5] to prove the security of our protocol
against collective attacks[12]. An argument for the security against the most general coherent
attacks[13] is given below. After Alice and Bob repeats the protocol n times to share a key
of length of 2n bits, the sum of the mutual information I(A,B) and I(A,E) should be less
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than 2n, i.e.,
I(A,B) + I(A,E) ≤ 2n . (30)
Equivalently speaking, I(A,B) + I(A,E) ≤ 1 per single qubit. This is because Eve
and Bob cannot acquire more information than is sent out mutually by Alice and
Bob whatever measurement is performed by Eve. Therefore, in order that I(A,B) >
I(A,E) (Theorem 1 in Ref. [5]), it suffices to have I(A,B) ≥ n. Since I(A,B) =
2n [1 + pd log2 pd + (1− pd) log2(1− pd)] , pd is required to be less than 0.110028, approx-
imately 11 %, which is the upper bound for the BB84 protocol[12, 13]. This proves that our
protocol is at least as secure as the BB84 protocol against collective attacks. The above lines
of proof applies only for collective attacks. However, it has been argued that the collective
attack may be the optimal one of the most general coherent attacks[14]. It is also interesting
to note that for incoherent attacks, I(A,E) in Eq. (28) is significantly restricted and hence
the sum I(A,B) + I(A,E) per single qubit is far less than 1; cf. (30). This is demonstrated
in Fig. 4 (b) comparing the sum for the BB84 protocol and for ours. It suggest that the
upper bound pd ≈ 11 % may be reduced further with proper analysis of the restriction on
the possible measurements by Eve. More detailed analysis of the security of our protocol
against the coherent attacks should therefore be an interesting topic for further studies in
the future.
IV. IMPERSONATION ATTACK
In our protocol, Alice sends a qubit to Bob and gets it back. So does Bob with another
travel qubit. It is possible for Eve to intercept the channel and pretend to be her/his
legitimate partner to each. One can think of two different ways of impersonation attack. In
the first method [see Fig. 5(a)], Eve uses two home qubits of her own. Eve can use one of the
two to share a perfect key with Alice following the procedures of the protocol in Section II,
and the other to share another key with Bob. However, the keys so generated to Alice and
Bob are independent and have no correlation. Therefore, by bit verification procedure, this
attack can be detected with probability 1/2.
In the second method [see Fig. 5(b)], Eve uses only one home qubit E of her own, which
is used for the interaction with both Alice and Bob. In this case, the total wave function of
11
FIG. 5: Impersonation attack
FIG. 6: Photon-number splitting attack.
the whole qubits is given by
(|↑↑↑〉+ |↓↓↓〉) ∣∣α¯β¯ǫ¯〉+ (|↑↓↑〉+ |↓↑↓〉) |α¯βǫ¯〉
+ (|↑↑↓〉+ |↓↓↑〉) |αβǫ〉+ (|↑↓↓〉+ |↓↑↑〉) ∣∣αβ¯ǫ〉 (31)
(not normalized), where the product states are arranged such as |...〉ABE |...〉CDE′ (E ′ is the
travel qubit of Eve’s). It then follows immediately that the detection probability of this
attack is still 1/2.
V. PHOTON NUMBER SPLITTING ATTACK
Finally, we investigate the security of the protocol against the photon number splitting
attack (PNS). (We note that the security analysis in the case of lossy channel is essentially
the same as that against the PNS attack.) Let us suppose that the photon source generate
three photons (the discussion can be trivially generalized to the case of more photons; see
below). Eve takes one photon (say E1) on the quantum channel from Alice to Bob and
another (E2) on the channel back to Alice from Bob; see Fig. 6. Only photon C finally
arrives at Alice’s hand. Similarly, Eve takes photons E ′1 and E
′
2 out of the photons from
12
FIG. 7: (color on-line) A variation of the protocol using four home qubits.
Bob. Bob receives back only D. The final state of the whole photons and home qubits are
given by
i |↑↑〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉− i |↓↓〉 |αβ〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉
+ |↑↓〉 |α¯β〉 |αβ〉 |αβ〉+ |↓↑〉 ∣∣αβ¯〉 |αβ〉 |αβ〉 , (32)
where the product states have been denoted according to the arrangement of the qubits such
as |..〉AB |..〉E1E2 |..〉E′1E′2 |..〉CD. Eve waits until Alice and Bob performs projective measure-
ment on their travel qubits C and D. Then the wave function in Eq. (32) collapses into
either
|↑↑〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉− |↓↓〉 |αβ〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 ∣∣α¯β¯〉 (33)
or
|↑↓〉 |α¯β〉 |αβ〉 |αβ〉+ |↓↑〉 ∣∣αβ¯〉 |αβ〉 |αβ〉 . (34)
Therefore, Eve can know the key without being detected simply by checking whether
〈ǫ1|ǫ2〉 〈ǫ′1|ǫ′2〉 > 0 (Alice and Bob share the key 0) 〈ǫ1|ǫ2〉 〈ǫ′1|ǫ′2〉 < 0 (Alice and Bob share the
key 1), where ǫ1, ǫ
′
1 = α, α¯ and ǫ2, ǫ
′
2 = β, β¯. This test can be easily done, for example, using
an interferometer. The discuss is trivially generalized to the case of even more photons. It
is enough for Eve to steal two photons from Alice and another two from Bob.
One may be tempted to overcome this problem using four home qubits (two for Alice and
two for Bob) as illustrated in Fig. 7. This scheme “hides” by means of entanglement the
output state of C and D even after Alice and Bob performs projective measurements on C
and D. However, following the similar lines as above, the total wave function of the whole
qubits is given by
13
− 1
4
∣∣α¯β¯〉 (|Φ+Ψ+〉 |Φ+Ψ+〉+ |Φ+Ψ−〉 |Φ+Ψ−〉 − |Φ−Ψ+〉 |Φ−Ψ+〉 − |Φ−Ψ−〉 |Φ−Ψ−〉)
− 1
4
∣∣α¯β¯〉 (|Ψ−Φ−〉 |Ψ+Φ+〉 − |Ψ−Φ+〉 |Ψ+Φ−〉+ |Ψ+Φ−〉 |Ψ−Φ+〉 − |Ψ+Φ+〉 |Ψ−Φ−〉)
− i
4
|αβ〉 (|Ψ−Ψ+〉 |Φ+Φ+〉 − |Ψ−Ψ−〉 |Φ+Φ−〉 − |Ψ+Ψ+〉 |Φ−Φ+〉+ |Ψ+Ψ−〉 |Φ−Φ−〉)
+
i
4
|αβ〉 (|Φ+Φ−〉 |Ψ+Ψ+〉+ |Φ+Φ+〉 |Ψ+Ψ−〉+ |Φ−Φ−〉 |Ψ−Ψ+〉+ |Φ−Φ+〉 |Ψ−Ψ−〉) (35)
arranging the product states such as |..〉CD |..〉A1A2B1B2 |..〉E1E2E′1E′2 Therefore, in order to
know the key, all Eve has to do is to distinguish the Bell state |Φ±〉 from |Ψ±〉, which is as
easy as the test for the two-home-qubit scheme analyzed above.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL FEASIBILITY
The parametric Faraday rotation of photon polarization by atomic spins have been widely
used in quantum optics and atomic physics. For example, it has been used for quantum
non-demolition measurement of the atomic spin[15, 16, 17]. However, because of the weak
atom-photon interaction, the Faraday rotation angle is usually quite small (several degrees).
To enhance the atom-photon interaction to achieve the rotation angle of π/2, one has to
put an atom to a cavity. However, trapping a single atom in a cavity is still technologically
challenging.
Another candidate for a conditional Faraday rotation of photon polarization is the quan-
tum dot in a micro-cavity, which has already been demonstrated experimentally[18, 19].
Here the photon interacts with the electron spin in the semiconductor quantum dot. The
transmission distance is limited mainly by the coherence time of the electron spin in the
quantum dot. The maximum transmission distance (given by the speed of light) would
be 10 m and 1 × 106 m for coherence times of 100 ns [20] and for 10 ms [21] in one-way
transmission. We believe the distance limitation will be extensively relaxed in the near
future.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new QKD protocol exploring the quantum states of the Faraday
rotators. The protocol is secure against eavesdropping for ideal single-photon source and
14
robust against impersonation attacks. This protocol is not allowed for multiphoton source
which produces more than two photons. The protocol could be implemented experimentally
with semiconductor quantum dots in micro-cavity.
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